After conducting a series of malicious computer attacks, defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to cause intentional damage to a protected computer and two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm. On appeal, defendant challenged his classification as an armed career criminal and the district court’s restitution order.
Where aiding and abetting provided no distinction from primary liability for a violent felony for ACCA purposes, and where defendant’s victims incurred investigation costs as part of their efforts to restore their websites and applications to proper functionality, the district court properly sentenced defendant.
Kobes, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment: “I join the court’s opinion except the portion of Section II that holds that aiding and abetting second-degree burglary in Minnesota is an ACCA predicate. I agree with the result, but I do not agree it is compelled by United States v. Salean, 583 F.3d 1059 (8th Cir. 2009). In my view, Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007) requires us to analyze whether there is “something special” about Minnesota aiding and abetting that makes it broader than generic aiding and abetting. Because I do not believe Minnesota strays from the generic definition, I join the judgment of the court.”
Judgment is affirmed.
U.S. v. Gammell (MLW No. 73729/Case No. 18-2211 – 14 pages) (U.S. Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit, Shepherd, J.) Appealed from U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota, Wright, J. (Rachel K. Paulose, University of St. Thomas School of Law, Minneapolis, MN for appellant; Robert D. Richman, of Saint Louis Park, MN on brief) (David Genrich, AUSA, of Minneapolis, MN for appellee)