Supreme Court reaffirms high standard for Rule 60(b)(6) relief

An appellate decision clarifying an essential element of aiding-and-abetting liability did not constitute “extraordinary circumstances” justifying relief from judgment for victims and families of victims of terror attacks who moved for leave to amend their complaint seeking to hold banks liable for providing financial services to Hamas-affiliated customers, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled in reversing a decision from the 2nd Circuit concluding a federal judge abused her discretion in denying relief under Civil Rule 60(b)(6).

In so ruling, the Supreme Court clarified that the “extraordinary circumstances” test consistently applied under Rule 60(b)’s “catchall” provision, Rule 60(b)(6), applies when a movant seeks to reopen a case for the purpose of filing an amended complaint.

Click here to read the full text of the June 5 decision in BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman.

• “Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) requires extraordinary circumstances. That standard does not become less demanding when a Rule 60(b)(6) movant also hopes to amend his complaint. Rather, a party seeking to reopen his case and re-plead must first satisfy Rule 60(b) on its own terms and obtain Rule 60(b) relief before Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment standard can apply. Because the Second Circuit’s balancing approach conflates this order of operations and dilutes Rule 60(b)(6)’s well-established standard, we must reject it.”
  — Justice Clarence Thomas, opinion of the court

• “The District Court’s primary justification for denying plaintiffs’ motion to reopen was that the Second Circuit’s ‘clarification’ of the applicable legal standard did not qualify as an extraordinary circumstance, particularly when plaintiffs were unlikely to prevail ‘[e]ven under the clarified standard.’ I concur in today’s judgment because I agree that the District Court did not abuse its discretion with respect to denying Rule 60(b)(6) relief on that basis. But I find the District Court’s alternative ground for denying reopening — that plaintiffs were at fault because they declined prior opportunities to amend their complaint — neither ‘persuasive’ nor consistent with ‘core tenets of Rule 60(b) doctrine.’ Assuming extraordinary circumstances otherwise exist, a plaintiff should not be faulted under Rule 60(b)(6) for reasonably having chosen to appeal rather than amend his complaint.”
  — Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, concurring