Missouri Supreme Court revives defamation suit

The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed in part a circuit court’s decision in a defamation suit, while vacating other portions of the ruling, concluding the lower court improperly granted directed verdicts based on the plaintiff’s failure to present “independent” evidence of reputational harm.

The defamation suit stems from romantic relationships between the plaintiff, Mouna Apperson, formerly known as Nicholas Apperson, and Natasha Kaminsky, as well as a relationship between Apperson and Adriene Norman. The former relationship lasted from 2012 to 2013, while the latter took place from 2016 to 2017.

After these relationships ended, Norman told more than one person Apperson raped and abused her, while Kaminsky told others both in person and through an “extensive social media campaign” that Apperson stalked and raped her, was a serial rapist and serial abuser, was restrained from coming within 500 feet of her and threatened to kill both her and Norman.

Following these statements by Norman and Kaminsky, Apperson was confronted in their home by a group of people, some of whom were armed, supporting the defendants. Apperson was consequently forced out of their home for seven months and, because of Kaminsky’s statements, was asked not to patronize a local coffee shop, disassociated with two organizations Apperson founded and lost a speaking engagement. Apperson was also involuntarily removed from a shared office space after Kaminsky told management Apperson raped her and insisted action be taken against them.

At the close of Apperson’s evidence, Norman and Kaminsky separately moved for directed verdicts, arguing Apperson failed to offer independent evidence that their reputation was damaged as a result of Norman and Kaminsky’s statements. The circuit court sustained the motions and entered judgment in the defendants’ favor, which Apperson appealed. The appeals court upheld the circuit court’s decision in January 2025.

Oral arguments were heard by the state’s highest court in September 2025. Apperson was represented during arguments by Justin Gelfand of Margulis Gelfand in St. Louis; Kaminsky and Norman were represented by John Reeves of Reeves Law in St. Louis.

In a Jan. 23 opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the portion of the circuit court’s decision granting directed verdicts on four counts against Norman that alleged Kaminsky was acting as her agent, noting Apperson abandoned those claims on appeal. However, the court vacated the judgment as to all remaining counts against Kaminsky and one remaining count against Norman and remanded those claims for a new trial.

In its opinion, the court emphasized the standard governing directed verdicts, noting appellate courts must view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the plaintiff” and assume the jury will believe evidence supporting the plaintiff’s case while rejecting contrary evidence.

Defamation, the court said, is a cause of action for damage to one’s reputation, and Missouri law requires proof of actual reputational harm in every case. But the court rejected the defendants’ argument that such harm must be shown through evidence independent of the plaintiff’s own testimony.

“There is no authority for that proposition, nor would there be any justification for such a rule,” the opinion stated.

While a plaintiff’s conclusory assertions or purely subjective beliefs are insufficient to establish reputational injury, the court said the law focuses on the nature of the evidence, not its source. If a plaintiff can competently testify to facts supporting a reasonable inference of reputational harm, that testimony may be sufficient to submit the issue to a jury.

The court distinguished prior cases in which defamation claims failed for lack of proof of damages, including Kenney v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Bauer v. Ribaudo and Taylor v. Chapman, noting those plaintiffs failed to show evidence their reputations were actually harmed, rather than just embarrassment or emotional distress.

In contrast, Apperson testified to several incidents showing outcomes allegedly resulting from the defendants’ statements, including being forced from their home, excluded from businesses and organizations and removed from the shared office space.

“These are by no means all of the incidents showing (or allowing the jury reasonably to infer) the damage done to Apperson’s reputation,” the court stated, “but they are more than sufficient to make a submissible case.”

The court also addressed confusion stemming from dicta in Kenney suggesting damages awards based solely on a plaintiff’s testimony are impermissible, calling that language “poorly vetted” and clarifying it should not be read to impose such a requirement.

“A plaintiff makes a submissible case on the element of damages in a defamation case if the plaintiff offers evidence (or a basis for a reasonable inference) of actual injury to his or her reputation, regardless of whether that evidence comes from the plaintiff’s testimony, the testimony of others, admissions, documentary evidence, or any other source,” stated the opinion.

Because Apperson presented sufficient evidence that a reasonable jury could find reputational injury, the court concluded the circuit court erred in granting directed verdicts on that basis.

The case is Mouna Apperson, f/k/a Nicholas Apperson v. Natasha Kaminsky, et al., Case No. SC101020.