Missouri Supreme Court weighs discipline for attorney who used racial slur toward assistant prosecutor

Summary

• Missouri Supreme Court heard arguments on disciplining attorney Scott L. Campbell
• Lawyer admitted violating professional conduct rule after using racial slur
• Dispute centers on whether punishment should be suspension or reprimand
• Case raises questions about attorney ethics, bias, and First Amendment protections

A Missouri attorney is facing suspension for using a racial slur against a Black, female military veteran and assistant prosecutor. The attorney’s counsel argued that because of mitigating factors including that the statement was “whispered” the court should consider a reprimand instead.

The state’s highest court heard arguments in the case on April 14. Andrea Spillars represented the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel and James Morrow of Morrow Willnauer Church represented attorney Scott L. Campbell.

Two judges from other districts — Kathleen Hamilton from the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District and Bryan E. Nickell from the Southern District — sat on the bench in the place of Chief Justice W. Brent Powell and Judge Zel M. Fischer.

Campbell violated Rule 4-8.4(g) which governs harassment, bias and prejudice, according to the 2025 filing by the Chief Disciplinary Counsel.

In March of 2024, Campbell was representing clients on a criminal docket in Platte County. While speaking with another attorney inside the courtroom, but before the hearing began, the other attorney was complaining about Lynnette Lockhart, a Black female assistant prosecutor.

The other attorney was bemoaning the difficulty of obtaining favorable plea offers from Lockhart when Campbell responded by using a racial slur, asking “[i]s it because she is a N$#*%$?” the OCDC reported in its stipulation of facts.

A month later, Campbell filed his response to the accusation and admitted his conduct violated Rule 4-8.4(g).

Because the conduct was knowing under ABA standard 7.2, the baseline discipline should be suspension, Spillars said.

“The ABA defines knowing as the conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct, but without the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a result,” Spillars said. “We cannot peer into respondent’s mind and determine his intent when he used that word to describe the assistant prosecutor as this court has recognized direct evidence of mental state is rarely available and mental state will often rest on circumstantial evidence and permissible inferences. The only reasonable inference based on the evidence in this case is that respondent knew by using that word, he was denigrating the assistant prosecutor based solely on her race.”

As a public citizen and as a member of the legal profession for more than 34 years, it is impossible to assume Campbell didn’t know better, Spillars argued. Campbell is a solo practitioner based in Platte City who has been licensed since 1990 and who specializes in domestic, municipal court and criminal cases.

“It is simply inconceivable that respondent was not aware of the historically negative racial connotations surrounding that slur,” she said. “To find otherwise would require we suspend belief.”

The definition of “knowing” also does not hinge on Campbell’s objectives, Spillars said.

“There were a myriad of other ways respondent could have conveyed his purported sentiment without using a racial slur,” she said. “Respondent’s conscious choice to use such a racially charged word when referring to another member of the legal profession was by definition, a knowing act.”

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While suspension must be the baseline discipline, Spillars said in light of mitigating factors a reprimand is appropriate.

Morrow began his arguments by saying at no time has he or Campbell defended the slur and agreed its use is reprehensible. But Morrow claims context is a mitigating factor.

“(This was) a whispered statement,” Morrow said. “It doesn’t excuse the statement at all. The context could have been worse had it been stated as an insult, as a bullying statement, as an intimidating statement in an effort to get something from someone, but we know that it was an isolated one time (incident), and there is absolutely no evidence in this record that this has ever been stated by Mr. Campbell at any other time, especially in a situation that would involve representation of a client.”

Whether the court judges the act under ABA 7.2 or 7.3, the appropriate discipline is a reprimand given the context, Morrow argued. He cited In re: Schuessler, in which this court reviewed the case of an attorney who used racist and homophobic language, as precedent that a reprimand is appropriate when the matter “is an isolated act and does not involve dishonest, fraudulent, or deceitful conduct on the part of the attorney.”

Morrow said there is no evidence that Campbell’s use of slurs is a pattern of activity, while in its filing, the OCDC said Campbell testified inconsistently about his prior use of the word.

“At the sworn statement, he initially acknowledged using the word only the ‘one time’ but then later stated he may have said it in a joking manner in the past,” according to the OCDC. “At the hearing, he testified to never using the term prior to April of 2024.”

Morrow said that attorneys, like everyone else, are protected under the First Amendment, except when they are representing a client. Because the speech occurred in the courtroom but before his appearance was filed or a hearing was started, this is a gray area.

Morrow added that his client has been remorseful and cooperative since day one.

After reading Campbell’s response to her complaint, Lockhart wrote another letter to the OCDC expressing concern about the lack of remorse Campbell seemed to show. A judge during oral arguments asked Morrow if Campbell apologized to Lockhart.

Morrow said Campbell apologized in the response, which Lockhart said was more an apology to the bar than to her, but has not since because he wanted the apology to be sincere and not a mitigating factor.

After reading a letter from Lockhart regarding the impact the incident had on her, Campbell resigned from his position on the Sixth Circuit Judicial Nominating Commission, a fact Morrow pointed to in his arguments for a reprimand versus suspension.

“Mr. Campbell’s isolated remark can only be understood as a misguided overreaction to the complaining attorney and without expressed discriminatory intent toward Ms. Lockhart,” according to Campbell’s brief. “Mr. Campbell’s isolated, rhetorical remark was a lapse of judgment, and Mr. Campbell has admitted the ethical violation. For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Campbell respectfully requests this court to find that the appropriate discipline under the facts of this case should be a public reprimand and for such other or further relief as this court deems just and equitable.”

The case is in re: Scott L. Campbell, case no. SC101338.