Attorney general, circuit attorney argue before Missouri Supreme Court over appeal rights

The Missouri Supreme Court is weighing whether the state has the right to appeal after a St. Louis circuit court vacated a first-degree murder conviction.

The court heard In re: Circuit Attorney, 22nd Judicial Circuit ex rel. Christopher Dunn during oral arguments Feb. 11. The case stems from a 1991 first-degree murder case, where Christopher Dunn was found guilty of murder and sentenced to life in prison without parole. The St. Louis circuit attorney eventually vacated Dunn’s conviction based on eyewitness accounts and other evidence — a motion that was opposed by the attorney general.

Charges were ultimately dropped against Dunn by the circuit court which the attorney general filed a notice of appeal against. The circuit attorney moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing the state has no right to appeal.

The attorney general was represented during arguments by Gregory Goodwin of the attorney general’s Jefferson City office. The circuit attorney was represented by Booker Shaw of Thompson Coburn in St. Louis.

During his arguments, Goodwin said that the state had the right to appeal under statute 547.031.

“The state is a party to these actions in this case represented by the attorney general, because the state’s interest in the finality of its judgment is what is at stake in the circuit court proceedings,” Good win said. “When a trial court errs in its order, granting relief, setting aside that judgement, it has necessarily aggrieved the state, because it has obviated the state’s interest in that final judgment.”

He also cited statute 512.02, arguing it grants the state a right to appeal as an aggrieved party.

“In civil cases, the right to appeal is … governed broadly by 512.02, which provides that any party aggrieved by a final judgment by appeal that final judgement unless the appeal is prohibited by the Missouri Constitution, which is not an issue in this case,” Goodwin said.

He contended that 547.031 is not a special statutory proceeding but rather a variation of Missouri’s longstanding post-conviction relief motion.

Chief Justice Mary Russell countered that while 547.031 may not be special, it is unique, akin to the Sexually Violent Predators Act.

The attorney general’s office maintained that 547.031 follows established legal procedures rather than creating entirely new ones.

“I would agree that there are, as I mentioned before, variations on that theme in terms of who may file, where it may be filed, but that’s not enough to have a completely new or rather completely unique proceeding,” Goodwin said. “The Sexually Violent Predator Act is substantially different from anything else in Missouri law for many reasons … And so, I think the … act is really a poor comparison to (547.031).”

Russell questioned how this case differed from the court’s decision in In Re: Salcedo.

“Like the Sexually Violent Predator Act, there is not direct language that says the attorney general has the right to appeal,” Russell said. “And in the Salcedo case, we clearly said because there was an absence of that language, the attorney general did not have the right to appeal.”

Goodwin responded that Salcedo concerned whether an appeal could be taken from a probable cause determination, which he called a “narrow” issue.

“The question at issue in the Salcedo case wasn’t whether the attorney general’s office could appeal. The question was … whether there could be an appeal from a determination of no probable cause, or a determination that there is probable … So, Salcedo is really very narrow as it relates to that,” Goodwin said.

During arguments for the circuit attorney, Shaw countered that the attorney general has no statutory right to appeal.

“The attorney general has no right to appeal under any statute or precedent here,” Shaw said, emphasizing that the right to appeal is purely statutory.

He added that granting the attorney general the right to appeal would amount to judicial legislation.

“Appellant is actually asking this court to legislate and create a right to appeal … This court should not invade the province of the legislature and grant them that right,” Shaw said.

Shaw further argued that statutory construction supports this position, stating that “specific language controls over general language,” and that “express mention of one thing implies exclusion of another.”

He said the legislature intentionally excluded the attorney general’s right to appeal.

“The legislature is presumed to have acted intentionally when it included a right to appeal in the prosecutor’s authority in subsection four, followed by the exclusion of that right from the attorney general’s authority in the very next sentence,” Shaw said.

Shaw also asserted that 547.031 is a special statutory proceeding, contrary to Goodwin’s position.

“First of all, it was previously unknown to the common law, created a unique proceeding not possible before its enactment, it’s entirely a creature of statute and exists nowhere else in Missouri,” Shaw said. “The General Assembly knows how to write statutes, and its exclusion of any language granting the appellant the right to appeal is a powerful, clear and explicit expression of legislative intent that they do not have that right.”

The case is In re: Circuit Attorney, 22nd Judicial Circuit ex rel. Christopher Dunn, case No. SC100878.

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