Question of who should pay after wrongful conviction suit reaches high court

A man who was wrongfully convicted and exonerated more than a decade ago is still waiting for compensation and is caught in the crossfire of a debate over control of the City of St. Louis’ police department. Now 23 years after his initial arrest, the Missouri Supreme Court is hearing his case.

At the heart of the matter is whether the city, the state, or the police officers who arrested the plaintiff are required to pay the judgment from his wrongful incarceration case.

Complicating matters is the fact that since the initial case, both the city of St. Louis and the state have traded control of the city’s police force with one another, with the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department once again coming under state control.

In 2003, Michael Holmes was arrested by SLMPD officers and was convicted for a crime he did not commit. He was incarcerated for more than five years on the charges, which were dismissed in 2011. In 2012, Holmes filed a wrongful conviction lawsuit.

When he was exonerated, Holmes sued the officers in federal court, and a jury returned a verdict in his favor in 2016, according to Holmes’ brief before this court.

However, by the time a verdict was reached in 2016, the state had ceded control of the police department to the city claiming it was a “successor in interest to the Police Board,” making it responsible for any outstanding police-related liability, according to the court.

In oral arguments, which the court heard on Feb. 10, Holmes was represented by David B. Owens of Loevy & Loevy in Chicago. The city was represented by Charles W. Hatfield of Stinson and the state (encompassing the commissioner of administration and attorney general) by Michael Pritchett of the attorney general’s office, both based in Jefferson City.

“Mr. Holmes stands in the shoes of two former St Louis Police Department officers. He secured a federal judgment against 10 years ago. That trial began in February 2016 here we are today, in February 2026,” Owens said. “At the time, the Attorney General promised a federal court that the judgment in this case would be definitely paid by the city of St Louis or by the state of Missouri. Now, 10 years later, that promise remains unfulfilled, and Holmes and maybe others and some of the litigants are eager to move on and put this matter behind us.”

This is part of the reason why Holmes argues transfer was providently granted, Owens said. If this court finds that the transfer was not providently granted, Owens asks that the court find as a matter of law that the federal verdict is subject to indemnification and must be paid by either the city of St Louis or the state of Missouri.

“The law cannot permit St Louis to refuse to indemnify law enforcement officers without any notice, without any form of agency determination by a board of commissioners years and years and years after those officers relied on the Police Board for their defense,” Owens said.

Owens identified two primary paths for finding indemnity as a matter of law. The first was non-contractual and focused on the relationship between the officers and police board. According to the board’s own policies, it required the officers to notify it in writing of their intent to seek representation from the board. The officers did so and requested they be notified in writing if their request was denied.

“The case proceeded for several years to a verdict,” Owens said. “During that case, the officers were represented by the attorney general’s office and that was because the board of police commissioners, acting upon (…) the officer’s letters, invoked the procedures for providing that defense.”

Even after the verdict, no notice was sent to the officers that the state would be withdrawing as their counsel.

The second theory the court can use to prove indemnification focuses on implied contractual indemnification, Owens said. The board’s own policy set forth a conditional offer; the officers followed those conditions, and the board sought representation from the attorney general’s office. This forced the officers to give up the right to their own defense and to rely upon the board.

Now, the state’s position is very different than it was in Holmes I, where the state assured this court in its 2020 oral arguments that the judgment was secured and would be paid either by the state or the city.

“Today, they’re saying something very different, which is that it’s totally fine that this judgment goes unsecured, and Holmes should be left going after the officers,” Owens said. “That’s an inconsistency that I do think warrants judicial estoppel. If this Court were to find that the city is not required (to pay).

In its brief, the state claims it is not required to pay the judgment from Missouri’s State Legal Expense Fund.

“Claims against police officers tendered to the Missouri Attorney General after August 28, 2005, are not eligible for payment as a direct claim against SLEF,” attorneys for the state said in its brief. “The claims against the former officers in this case were first asserted when plaintiff filed his lawsuit in December 2012 and thus were not tendered to the Missouri Attorney General before that date. Thus, under Holmes, these claims are not eligible for direct payment from SLEF because they were tendered after August 28, 2005.”

Because of this, SLEF would be unable to reimburse the city if it paid the claim.

The city argues this court “providently granted transfer;” that Holmes was not entitled to summary judgment because the Board of Police Commissioners did not obligate the city to pay the judgment as a matter of law; that there are no material disputes of fact that would have permitted a reasonable trier of fact to find the city obligated itself to indemnify the officers; and that the law does not require the city to indemnify the officers.

As alternative grounds for affirming the lower court’s decision, the city also argues that the police board “holds sovereign immunity and did not consent to waive sovereign immunity and Indemnify the police officers.”

Hatfield also points out that the city should not be forced to pay the judgment based on a statement the state’s lawyers made in the 2020 case.

Hatfield acknowledged that Holmes was “terribly wronged.” This fact has been litigated, but in the same case where the court determined Holmes was wrongfully convicted, the city was dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds, among others, he said.

“So, the issue now is not whether the city wronged Mr. Holmes. That’s already been decided. The issue now is whether indemnity requires the taxpayers of the city of St. Louis to pay the judgment that a jury entered against these officers,” Hatfield said.

The case is: Michael J. Holmes v. Kenneth Zellers, Catherine Hanaway, Mayor Cara Spencer, Bettye Battle-Turner, Richard Gray, Thomas Irwin, Erwin Switzer, Francis Slay, and City of St. Louis Case No. SC101250.